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ABSTRACT: My modest aim in this paper is to prove certain relations between some type 
of hyper-intensional operators, namely context shifting operators, and compositionality 
in natural languages. Various authors (e.g. von Fintel & Matthewson 2008; Stalnaker 
2014) have argued that context-shifting operators are incompatible with composition-
ality. In fact, some of them understand Kaplan’s (1989) famous ban on context-shifting 
operators as a constraint on compositionality. Others, (e.g. Rabern 2013) take context-
shifting operators to be compatible with compositionality but, unfortunately, do not 
provide a proof, or an argument in favor of their position. The aim of this paper is to do 
precisely that. Additionally, I provide a new proof that compositionality for proposi-
tional content (intension) is a proper generalization of compositionality for character 
(hyper-intensions).  
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1. Introduction  
 Formal semantics has recently witnessed a flurry of interest on whether 
natural languages contain a special type of hyper-intensional operators (i.e. 
context-shifting operators) or not (see Rabern & Ball 2017, Santorio 2012 
and the many references therein). Ever since Kaplan (1989) there has been 
a certain resistance in accepting that some natural language expressions are 
best modeled as context-shifting operators. One reason for this resistance 
is that, apparently, such operators cannot be handled compositionally.  
 The hypothesis that natural languages have a compositional semantics 
is usually taken to play a part in explaining their productive feature; that is 
in explaining speakers’ ability to produce and understand complex expres-
sions that they have never encountered before. Compositionality is, thus, a 
fundamental tenet of formal semantics, one that formal semanticists are 
extremely reluctant to renounce. Though, of course, some philosophers of 
a Wittgensteinian and Austinian bent who doubt that formal semantics is a 
viable project (because it can’t model the pervasive and radical forms of 
context sensitivity present in natural languages), are ready to deny that nat-
ural languages are compositional (see Travis 1996). The formulation of 
compositionality most commonly found in philosophical and linguistic lit-
erature is the following: a language is compositional if the meaning of each 
of its complex expressions is determined by their syntactic structure and 
the meanings of their respective constituents. Although there is no consen-
sus on the precise interpretation this general formulation, most semanticists 
take it to mean that a language is compositional if the meaning of each of 
its complex expressions is a function of their syntactic structures and of the 
meaning of their respective constituents.2 As Partee (1995, 153) points out 
                                                          
2  There are dissenters, though. For example, Szabó (2000; and 2013) argues that 
the intuitive formulation of compositionality (the meaning of complexes is deter-
mined by the meaning of constituents and syntactic structure) is stronger than, and 
not captured well by the formulation of compositionality in terms of functions: the 
meaning of a complex expression is a function of the meaning of its constituents and 
its syntactic structure. This is correct, but the solution is to put constraints on what 
functions can be employed as composition functions in natural language semantics. 
The principle of compositionality defined in terms of functions claims only that the 
meaning of a complex expression is a function of the meanings of its constituents and 
its syntactic structure. The principle is silent with respect to what that function can 
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“the principle can be made precise only in conjunction with an explicit the-
ory of meaning and of syntax, together with a fuller specification of what 
is required by the relation ‘is a function of’.” This is to say that different 
specifications of syntax, of what meaning is, and of what meaning rules 
(i.e. functions) are acceptable in natural language semantics can give rise 
to different interpretations of the principle, and these interpretations might 
settle different constraints on semantic theories. In other words, in order to 
give a formally precise formulation of compositionality two things are 
needed: an account of how complex expressions in natural languages are 
syntactically generated and an account of what meaning is. In what follows 
I’ll give only the minimal details of how syntax of natural languages and 
their meanings can be formally modeled; details that suffice for a precise 
formulation of compositionality.  
 The complex expressions of a language are generated by a syntax Σ, 
which can be represented as an algebra Σ = (E, A, F), where E is the set of 
linguistic expressions of the language, A the set of simple expressions of 
the language (thus A ⊂ E), and F the set of syntactic rules of the language. 
Members of F are functions defined over E and with values in E, and E 
is closed under operations in F (i.e. every member of E is either a member 
of the subset A or is the value of an operation of F on members of E). 
Given that natural language expressions belong to different grammatical 
categories, and that each syntactic rule concerns only expressions of cer-
tain grammatical categories and not of others, each member of F is de-
fined over expressions of certain grammatical categories and with values 
in expressions of certain grammatical categories. In other words, each 
syntactic rule is specified in terms of the grammatical categories of its 
arguments as well as the category of its value. One way to formally im-
plement this insight is to take the set E of expressions to be an indexed 
                                                          
be. But, obviously not any function can be employed as a composition function in 
natural languages, for although there are an indefinite number of ways in which 
meanings can combine, some of them could not possibly be ways in which meanings 
in natural languages combine. In other words, there must be a restriction on what 
functions are acceptable composition functions (i.e. ways of combining meanings) 
for natural languages. This amounts to restricting the class of acceptable semantic 
rules in natural languages. For various constraints put on composition functions see 
Keenan & Stabler (1996), Szabó (2000), and Dever (2006). 
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family of sets: E = (Eg)g∈G where G is the set of sorts which model gram-
matical categories, and for each g ∈ G there is a set Eg which is the set of 
expressions of category g. Then each syntactic rule α ∈ F is defined only 
on certain sets Eg; that is it yields a value only for sequences of expressions 
of E which belong to certain grammatical categories. For example, in mod-
eling English there will be a set EN (for nouns) and a set EV (for verbs) and 
a syntactic rule which is a function defined on ordered pairs 〈eN, eV〉 where 
eN ∈ EN and eV ∈ EV and with values in the set EVP (for verb-phrases).3  
 A semantics is an interpretation function µ that maps expressions on 
meanings: that is, a function defined over E and with values in a set M of 
meanings.4 Then compositionality can be formulated in a precise form in 
the following way:  
A semantics µ is compositional iff for any syntactic rule α ∈ F there is 
function f such that for any expressions e1, …, en of E, if α(e1, …, en) is 
meaningful then: µ(α(e1, …en)) = f(α, µ(e1), …µ(en)).  
 What kind of entities are the members of M? What is meaning, in other 
words? It has been long noticed that when it comes to natural languages we 
should distinguish two types of meaning: what an expression means inde-
pendently of any context of utterance, and what an expression means rela-
tive to a context of utterance. The first type of meaning roughly corre-
sponds to what speakers know when they know the meaning of an expres-
sion but are completely oblivious to the details of the context in which the 
                                                          
3  The rule given here for exemplification is, of course, very course-grained. A proper 
representation of English syntax must take into account other features like subject-verb 
agreement. Representing syntax as many sorted algebras is favored by Janssen (1983) 
and Hendriks (2001). But this is not the only way to model syntax. Hodges (2001) and 
Pagin & Westerståhl (2010) prefer to represent grammars as partial algebras were syn-
tactic rules are represented as functions which are simply undefined on unwanted argu-
ments. A note on notation: from now on, I’ll ignore the superscripts for grammatical 
categories.  
4  If we believe that some expressions (e.g. “Green ideas sleep furiously”) are gram-
matical but meaningless we should take µ to be a partial function: undefined for some 
members of E. If one believes that “Green ideas sleep furiously” is grammatical and 
meaningful, but false, and that there are no grammatical but meaningless expressions 
(as Magidor 2009 does), then one can let µ be defined over all members of E.  
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expression was uttered. The second type of meaning roughly corresponds 
to what speakers know when they know what is said by an expression at a 
particular context of utterance.  
 Following Kaplan (1989), the established term for the latter type of 
meaning is propositional content. Propositional content can be thought of 
as the information that determines the extension of an expression at possi-
ble states of affairs, and thus can be modeled as an intension: a function 
from possible worlds to extensions (individuals for singular terms, sets for 
predicates, and truth-values for sentences). Given that expressions of natu-
ral languages are context-sensitive, they can be assigned propositional con-
tent only relative to a context of utterance. Notice that in the absence of a 
context the English sentence “I am hungry” fails to have express anything 
which is truth-evaluable, since in order to determine its truth-value we need 
to determine who uttered it when. Moreover, depending on who utters it, 
“I am hungry” expresses different things: if uttered by David Kaplan it ex-
presses the content that David Kaplan is hungry, if uttered by Saul Kripke 
it expresses the content that Saul Kripke is hungry. Thus we say that “I am 
hungry” expresses different contents at different contexts of utterance. 
Then propositional content is a property of expressions at contexts, and a 
semantics that assigns propositional content will assign it not to expres-
sions themselves but to expressions at contexts. Let MI be the set of inten-
sions, then for any meaningful e of E and context C, µ(e, C) ∈ MI, is such 
that µ (e, C): W → Ext (where W is the set of possible worlds, and Ext is 
the set of possible extensions). Each w ∈ W is an extension determining 
circumstance, in the sense that the extension of an expression is always 
given relative to a w.5 Using the standard notation ⟦e⟧w for the extension 
of e at w, we write the content of the expression as λw.⟦e⟧w. Notice that 
                                                          
5  There is a long lasting debate in formal semantics on whether we can model nat-
ural languages with sparse circumstances of evaluation, consisting only of possible 
worlds, or whether we need richer ones. For example, Kaplan (1989) argues that we 
should take circumstances of evaluations to consist of world-time pairs. Others argue 
that circumstances of evaluation are even richer than that (see Kölbel 2008 for an 
overview). If we take circumstances of evaluation to be world-time pairs we should 
define intensions in the following way. Let W be the set of possible worlds, T the set 
of time moments, and W×T their Cartesian product, then each µ(e, C) ∈ MI, is such 
that µ(e, C): W×T → Ext. 
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the propositional content of some natural language expressions (e.g. de-
scriptions like “the president of France”) can be best modeled as non-con-
stant functions from worlds to extensions, while the propositional content 
of other expressions (e.g. proper names like “David Kaplan”) can, argua-
bly, be treated as a constant function from worlds to extensions. 
 Also following Kaplan (1989) the established term for the meaning that 
expressions have independent of context is character. The character of an 
expression is the convention associated with that expression and something 
like a rule of use: it tells what an expression can say when used in any arbi-
trary context. Characters are a property of expressions themselves, and can 
be modeled as functions from possible contexts of utterance to propositional 
contents; that is, as hyperintensions. Let MH be the set of hyperintensions, 
then, for any meaningful expression e of E, µ*(e) ∈ MH is such that µ*(e) : K 
→ MI, where K is the set of possible contexts. Contexts as formal objects of 
the theory have the job to represent the concrete situations in which language 
use takes place. Given that any use of an expression is performed by some-
one, at a place and time and in a possible world, then each C ∈ K is an ordered 
tuple of parameters consisting of an agent a, a world w, a time t and a location 
l: C = 〈a, w, t, l〉.6 Notice that the character of some natural language expres-
sions (e.g. indexicals: “I”, “here”, “now”, etc., descriptions: “the tallest man 
in town”, etc.) can be best modeled as a non-constant function from contexts 
to propositional content, while the characters of others (e.g. proper names, 
numerals) are best treated as constant functions. 
 If we distinguish between the meaning that an expression has independ-
ent of context of use, and the meaning that it has relative to a context of 
use, and we decide to model the first as a function from contexts to func-
tions from possible worlds to extensions, then the extension of an expres-
sion is double relative. The extension of an expression is a function of the 
                                                          
6  Some theorists (e.g. Stalnaker and his followers) prefer to represent contexts in a 
finer-grained manner, as the common ground between the participants in a conversa-
tional setting (i.e. the body of information commonly available to conversational part-
ners) which can be modeled as the set of possible worlds compatible with the presumed 
common knowledge of the participants. These two notions of context can be comple-
mentary: a context as a common ground is determined by a context as a tuple of param-
eters: it is a fact about an agent at a world, time and place that she is presupposing 
certain propositions and that certain propositions are common ground in the conversa-
tion she is taking part. See Stalnaker (2014, 24-26) for elaborations.  
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context of utterance and of the circumstance of evaluation, and the two play 
different roles in determining the extension.7 The character of an expres-
sion e determines, relative to any context C, the propositional content of e 
at C, which in its turn determines its extension, relative to any world w. 
Then I’ll write ⟦e⟧c, w for the extension of e at C and w, and write the char-
acter of e as: λc.λw⟦e⟧c, w. 
 Then, a theorist has two options when it comes to giving an account of 
natural languages. She can choose a semantics that assigns characters: a 
function defined over E and with values in the set of characters MH. Alter-
natively, she can choose a semantics that assigns propositional content to 
expressions in context: a function defined over the Cartesian product of E 
and the set of contexts K with values in the set of propositional contents 
MI. The first option is: 
 µ*: E → MH, where each member of MH is a function µ*(e): K → MI  
 µ: ExK → MI, where each member of MI is a function µ(e, C): W → 
Extension  
Observe that µ* is the curryied version of µ.8  
                                                          
7  To better see the need for double evaluation, consider the sentence: “Once, every-
one now alive hadn’t been born yet.” Observe that in order to determine its truth-value 
we need to determine who is alive at the context of utterance; that is we need to look at 
the time of the context of utterance and determine the reference of the restrictor “alive 
now”. But this is not enough. In order to determine its truth-value we also need to look 
in the past: to see whether it is true that there was a time in the past at which those alive 
at the time of the context of utterance were not born yet. In other words, “once” takes 
the propositional content expressed by the sentence embedded under it, and evaluates 
it to all time moments that precede the time of the context, such that it yields true if 
there is a time previous to the time of the context at which the propositional content is 
true. Notice that the distinct evaluations at time-moments play different roles: one is to 
fix the reference of “alive now”, (reference which cannot be shifted by “once”) and the 
other to evaluate for truth-value the propositional content expressed at the context of 
utterance by the sentence embedded under “once”.  
8  Currying is a standard procedure by which the addicity of a function can be reduced. 
Given a function f of type f: (X × Y) → Z, currying it provides the function f*: X → (Y 
→ Z). See Curry, Feys & Craig (1958). 
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2. Compositionality for Content and for Character 
 Depending on whether we define compositionality for propositional 
content or for character, formulations of different strength are obtained. 
This is how semanticists traditionally formulated compositionality for 
character and for propositional content respectively.9  
 i. Compositionality of character: The character of a complex expres-
sion is a function of the character of its constituents and of its syntactic 
structure. More precisely, a semantics µ* is character compositional iff for 
any syntactic rule α there is a function f such that for any e1, …, en if 
α(e1, …, en) is meaningful then:  
 µ*(α(e1, …, en)) = f(α, µ*(e1), …, µ*(en)).  
 A semantics fails to be character compositional if for some expressions 
ei, ej, ek, ∈ E and syntactic rule α,  
  µ*(ej) = µ*(ek) and µ*(α(ei, ej)) ≠ µ*(α(ei, ek)).  
 A semantics fails to be character compositional if substitution of char-
acter-equivalent expressions within a larger one does not preserve the char-
acter of the larger expression. In plain words, a semantics fails to be char-
acter compositional if substitution of synonyms is not character preserving 
in that semantics. To give an illustration, a semantics of English (or of a 
fragment of English) fails to be character compositional if it assigns the 
same characters to “attorneys” and to “lawyers”, but assigns different char-
acters to “Attorneys are rich” and “Lawyers are rich”. 
 ii. Compositionality for content: given that content is assigned to ex-
pression-context pairs, in order to formulate compositionality for content 
we need to take into account the role that context plays in the determination 
of the content of complexes. Standardly, compositionality for content is 
                                                          
9  See Kaplan (1989, 507) where both varieties are given informally. For their formal 
rendering see Pagin & Westerståhl (2010, 259-260) and Dever (2006, 634).  
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formulated in the following way. The content of a complex expression rel-
ative to a context is a function of the content of its constituents at that con-
text and of its syntactic structure. More precisely, a semantics µ is content 
compositional iff for every syntactic rule α there is a function f such that 
for any expressions e1, …, en ∈ E and for any context C, if α(e1, …, en) is 
meaningful at C then: 
  µ(α(e1, …, en), C) = f(α, µ(e1, C), …, µ(en, C))  
 A semantics fails to be content compositional if the substitution of co-
intensional expressions within a larger expression does not guarantee to 
preserve the intension (content) of the larger expression. More precisely, a 
semantics fails to be content compositional if there is a syntactic rule α, 
some expressions ei, ej, ek, and context of utterance C, such that  
 µ(ej, C) = µ(ek, C) and µ(α(ei, ej), C) ≠ µ(α(ei, ek), C) 
 For example, a semantics that assigns to “I” relative to a context C, 
which has David as its agent parameter, the same content that it assigns to 
“David” at context C, but assigns different contents to “I am hungry” and 
“David is hungry” at C fails to be content compositional. If the failure con-
dition obtains then the content of α(ei, ej) at C and the content of α(ei, ek) 
at C are not a function of the content of their constituents at C, for a func-
tion should returns the same value given the same argument.10  
                                                          
10  In order to avoid a potential retort that would side-track the discussion, let me point 
out that there is another way in which compositionality for content can fail: as a result 
of context-shift failure. That is, a semantics fails to be content compositional if a com-
plex expression varies its content across contexts of utterance although its constituents 
have unvarying contents across the very same contexts of utterance. Formally, if there 
are some expressions ei, ej, syntactic rule α and contexts C1, C2 such that 
 µ(ei, C1) = µ(ei, C2) and µ(ej, C2) = µ(ej, C2) and µ(α(ei, ej), C1) ≠ µ(α(ei, ej), C2) 
obtain. 
 Nevertheless, the failure to preserve content under the substitution of co-intensional 
parts is more calamitous than context-shift failure, in the sense that any semantics that 
fails to preserve intension under the substitution of co-intensional parts also exhibits 
context-shift failure, but not the other way around. For proofs, see Pagin (2005, Apen-
dix 1) and Westerståhl (2012). Relatedly, some authors (e.g., Pagin 2005; Lasersohn 
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 Given the relation between µ* and µ, if a semantics µ satisfies or fails 
to satisfy content compositionality so does its curryied version µ*, and vice-
versa: if a semantics µ* satisfies or fails to satisfy character compositional-
ity so does its un-curryied version µ. 
3. Some context-shifting operators  
 The double-index framework introduced above allows us to treat some 
expressions as hyper-intensional operators, in the same manner in which it 
allows us to treat certain expressions as intensional operators. As it is well 
known, intensional operators take the intension of an expression and eval-
uate it at alternative circumstances of evaluation: in other words, they shift 
the circumstance of evaluation at which the intension they operate on is 
evaluated. Hyper-intensional operators work at the level character in the 
same fashion in which intensional operators work at the level of content. 
Whether natural languages contain expressions which are best treated as 
context-shifting operators, or whether such expressions can be added to a 
natural language is still a matter of debate.11 Just as an intensional operator 
                                                          
2012) have proposed two readings for compositionality for content: a stronger and a 
weaker one, where (a) the strong one entails the weak one but not the other way around; 
(b) the strong version has as its negation condition, context-shift failure, and (c) the 
weak version has its negation condition the failure to preserve intension under substi-
tution of co-intensional parts. If (a) is true so is its contrapositive: (d) failure to preserve 
intension under substitution of co-intensional parts entails context-shift failure.  
11  Kaplan (1989, 510-511) answers in negative to both questions, but Perry & Israel 
(1986) and Santorio (2012) argue that some epistemic modals of English are best treated 
as context-shifting operators. Since it is still a matter of debate whether there are Eng-
lish expressions that are best treated as context-shifting operators, I focus the discussion 
on the rather artificial construction “in some other context”. To get a flavor of how such 
operators might look like in English, Israel & Perry (1996, 311) suggest that we con-
sider sentences containing epistemic modals evaluated under the veil of ignorance, as 
when the speaker of a context is ignorant about the values of the contextual parameters. 
Santorio (2012, 291) imagines precisely such a scenario: Rudolf and Carl, two amnesi-
acs, are kidnapped. Each of them knows that he is one of them but not which one. They 
are subjected to the following experiment, about which are informed: both are anesthe-
tized and a coin is tossed. If the coin lands head, Rudolf will be killed and Carl released 
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shifts the circumstance at which an expression is evaluated, a hyper-inten-
sional operator shifts the context at which the sentence is evaluated. In this 
sense, they are context-shifting operators. For illustration, consider the sen-
tence  
 (1)  I am hungry  
and the sentence (2) obtained from (1) by prefixing it with the (rather arti-
ficial) context-shifting operator “In some other context”:  
 (2)  In some other context I am hungry.  
Where, by stipulation, (2) is true in the context of utterance just in case the 
agent of some other context is hungry at the time and world of that other 
context. In other words, (2) is true at the context of utterance if and only if 
there is some other context C* such that (1) expresses a content that is true 
at circumstance determined by C*. In other words, the operator “In some 
other context” operates on the character of (1): it takes the character of (1), 
evaluates it at alternative contexts, and yields true if and only if there is an 
alternative context C* such that the content of (1) at C* is true at the cir-
cumstances of C*. We can introduce this operator (abbreviated as Op) in 
the following way:  
 Op(S) is true at C iff there is a context C* such that S is true at C*.  
 In the course of evaluation of Op(S) at context C we evaluate S at con-
text C*: what the operator Op does is to look across contexts and yield true 
if there is a context C* such that S is true at C*. Before I move on, let me 
point one more thing. Notice that given that the character of some natural 
language expressions (e.g. proper names) is modeled as a constant function 
                                                          
on Harvard’s campus, if it lands tail, Carl will be killed and Rudolf released on Stan-
ford’s Campus. Later on, one of them wakes up and utters: “I might be in Stanford” and 
“But I might well be in Harvard”. Intuitively both sentences are true. Then “I” refers to 
two different individuals, irrespective of the actual context of utterance. Schlenker 
(2002) argues that certain propositional attitude verbs in Amharic and English are best 
treated as context-shifting operators, but see Maier (2016) for a defense of Kaplanian 
ban on such operators.  
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from contexts to propositional content, if we embed such an expression 
under a context-shifting operator their content doesn’t get shifted. Context-
shifting operators shift only the content of expressions whose character is 
a non-constant function from context to propositional content. Compare 
with intensional operators: intensional operators cannot shift the extension 
of expressions whose propositional content is treated as a constant function 
(e.g. proper names, among others), but only of those whose propositional 
content is treated as a non-constant function (e.g. descriptions, among oth-
ers). 
4. Compositionality and context-shifters  
 Context-shifting operators are not compatible with compositionality for 
content, but they are compatible with compositionality for character. Re-
member, a semantics µ fails to be content compositional if the following 
obtains: for some expressions ei, ej, en, syntactic rule α and context of ut-
terance C:  
  µ(ej, C) = µ(en, C) and µ(α(ei, ej), C) ≠ µ(α(ei, en), C) 
That is, if relative to a context C two expressions ej and en are assigned the 
same content µ(ej, c) = µ(en, c), but two complex expressions α(ei, ej) and 
α(ei, en) are assigned different contents relative to C, then such a semantics 
is not content compositional.  
 Given that µ* is the curryied version of µ, we can write the failure con-
dition in the following way: for some expressions ei, ej, en, syntactic rule α 
and context of utterance C:  
 µ*(ej)(C) = µ*(en)(C) and µ*(α(ei, ej))(C) ≠ µ*(α(ei, en))(C) 
 It can be easily shown that context-shifting operators are incompatible 
with content-compositionality. If Op(S) is a sentence that contains a con-
text-shifting operator, the content of Op(S) at a context of utterance is not 
a function of the content of its constituents at that context of utterance. 
Rather, the content of Op(S) at a context C is a function of the content of 
its constituent S at a context C*, where C ≠ C*. In more detail, if two co-
14  A D R I A N  B R I C I U  
 
intensional expressions are embedded under context-shifting operators 
their substitution does not guarantee, anymore, preservation of neither con-
tent nor truth. Consider a language L (which is a fragment of English) for 
which a content compositional semantics µ can be given. Assume that that 
for the two sentences of L  
 (Φ)  I am hungry  
and  
 (Ψ)  Kaplan is hungry  
and context C1 (where C1 is such that Kaplan is its agent) Φ is true at C1 iff 
the agent of C1 is hungry at the time of C1 and Ψ is true at the same context 
if Kaplan is hungry at the time of the context. Given that Kaplan is the 
agent of C1, Ψ and Φ express the same content at C1: a function from pos-
sible worlds w to truth-values which yields true if Kaplan is hungry at the 
time and world of C1 and yields false otherwise. That is: µ(Φ, C1) = µ(Ψ, 
C1). Since (by assumption) L has a semantics µ which is content composi-
tional the contents of Φ and Ψ relative to C1 are a function of the contents 
of their respective constituents at C1 and of their respective syntactic struc-
ture.  
 Now consider an extension M of the initial language L. M contains all 
expressions of L plus the sentential operator AtC2 and sentences con-
structed with the help of this operator. Thus, for any sentence S if S is a 
sentence of L then S is also a sentence of M. And for any sentence S of L 
there is a sentence of the form AtC2 S in M. We give a semantics µM for M 
that assigns propositional content and preserves, or inherits the assign-
ments of semantics µ for L. For any sentence S of L the semantic function 
µM of M agrees with the semantic function µ of L: µ(S) = µM(S). In other 
words, the semantics µM of M is the same as semantics µ of L for all sen-
tences that do not contain the operator AtC2.  
 The operator AtC2 is defined as follows. For any context C, the sentence 
(AtC2, S) is true relative to C iff S is true at C2. In other words, AtC2 is a 
function that takes the character of S and evaluates it at context C2 such 
that the complex sentence (AtC2, S) is true at C iff the evaluation of the 
character of S at C2 yields true. That is, µ*M(AtC2, S)(C) = 1 iff µ*M(S)(C2) 
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= 1. Notice that by un-currying µ* we can define the operator for a seman-
tics that assigns propositional content to expression-context pairs: AtC2 is 
a function such that for any sentence S and any context C, it takes the con-
tent expressed by S at C (i.e. µM(S, C)) and yields the content expressed by 
S at C2 (i.e. µM(S, C2)). In other words, for any context C, µM(AtC2, S), C) 
= µM(S, C2).  
 It is easy to show that semantics µM of the extended language M is not 
content compositional. Take the two sentences (Φ) and (Ψ) and build two 
sentences with the help of the sentential operator AtC2. We get the follow-
ing sentences in the extended language: 
 (Υ)  AtC2 I am hungry 
 (Ω)  AtC2 Kaplan is hungry 
 Suppose that C1 and C2 differ at most with respect to the agent of the 
context: Kaplan is the agent of C1 but not the agent of C2. Then, (Υ) is true 
at C1 iff the speaker of C2 is hungry at the world of C2. But notice that (Ω) 
is true at C1 iff Kaplan is hungry at the world of C1. The content expressed 
by (Υ) at C1 is different than the content expressed by (Ω) at C1: 
 µM(AtC2, Φ), C1) ≠ µM(AtC2, Ψ), C1) 
Given that M is an extension of L, and its semantics µM preserves the as-
signments of µ for expressions of L, since µ(Φ, C1) = µ(Ψ, C1) then µM(Φ, 
C1) = µM(Ψ, C1). Then, µM is not content compositional because for some 
expressions Φ and Ψ, syntactic structure and context C1, µM(Φ, C1) = 
µM(Ψ, C1) and µM(AtC2, Φ), C1) ≠ µM(AtC2, Ψ), C1). ■ 
 The extended language satisfies, nevertheless, character composition-
ality. Remember, a semantics µ* fails to be character compositional if the 
following obtains: for some expressions, ei, ej, en, and syntactic rule α: 
 µ*(ej) = µ*(en) and µ*(α(ei, ej)) ≠ µ*(α(ei, en))  
 By currying µM we obtain a function µ*M and it can be showed that µ*M 
is character compositional. All we need to show is that the following holds 
for µ*M: there are no expressions ei, ej, en, and syntactic rule α such that 
µ*M(ej) = µ*M(en) and µ*M(α(ei, ej)) ≠ µ*M(α(ei, en)). Given the definition 
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of AtC2 operator the following holds true of (Υ): for any context C, 
µM(AtC2, Φ)C) = µM(Φ, C2). For the µ*M semantics we write this in the 
following way:  
 (1)  For any C, µ*M(AtC2, Φ)(C) = µ*M(Φ)(C2) 
and the following holds true of (Ω) 
 (2)  For any C, µ*M(AtC2, Ψ)(C) = µ*M(Ψ)(C2) 
We can show by reductio that µ*M character compositional. Assume that 
µ*M for M is not character compositional. Then for some expressions Φ and 
Ψ the following holds (which is the failure condition for character compo-
sitionality): 
 (3)  µ*M(AtC2, Φ) ≠ µ*M(AtC2, Ψ) 
 (4)  µ*M(Φ) = µ*M(Ψ)  
From (4) we get (by definition of µ*):  
 (5)  For any C, µ*M(Φ)(C) = µ*M(Ψ)(C)  
From (5) we get (by universal instantiation):  
 (6)  µ*M(Φ)(C2) = µ*M(Ψ)(C2) 
From (1), (2), and (6) we get: 
 (7)  For any C, µ*M(AtC2, Φ)(C) = µ*M(AtC2, Ψ)(C) 
From (3) and the definition of µ*M we get: 
 (8)  There is a C, such that µ*M(AtC2, Φ)(C) ≠ µ*M(AtC2, Ψ)(C) 
But (8) contradicts (7), therefore µ*M is character compositional – i.e. ¬((3) 
& (4)). ■ 
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 In brief, I showed that there are semantics that satisfy character compo-
sitionality but fail to satisfy content compositionality, namely those of lan-
guages that contain context-shifting operators. Interestingly, if we can 
show that any semantics which satisfies content compositionality also sat-
isfies character compositionality, then together these results show that con-
tent compositionality is a proper generalization of character composition-
ality.12  
 I’ll show, now, that if a semantics is content compositional then it is 
also character compositional. This is a proof by contraposition. It is easy 
to prove that if a semantics fails to be character compositional then it also 
fails to be content compositional which is the contrapositive of the claim 
that if a semantics satisfies content compositionality it also satisfies char-
acter compositionality.  
 A semantics fails to be character compositional if for some expressions 
ei, ej, and en and syntactic rule α the following assignments hold: 
 (a)  µ*(ej) = µ*(en) and  
 (b)  µ*(α(ei, ej)) ≠ µ*(α(ei, en)). 
Notice that by definition of µ*  
 (a) entails (a’): ∀C, µ*(ej) (C) = µ*(en)(C) and  
 (b) entails (b’): ∃C* such that µ*(α(ei, ej))(C*) ≠ µ*(α(ei, en))(C*). 
The conjunction of (a’) and (b’) entails failure of content compositionality: 
there are some expressions ei, ej, en, syntactic rule α and a context C* such 
that µ*(ej)(C*) = µ*(en)(C*) and µ*(α(ei, ej))(C*) ≠ µ*(α(ei, en))(C*). ■ 
 In conclusion, if a semantics satisfies content compositionality then it 
also satisfies character compositionality. 
                                                          
12  This is an alternative proof to the one given in Westerståhl (2012). His proof,  
though, is significantly different than the one given here, and I believe that the proof 
given here is much simpler than the one he gives.  
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5. Conclusion  
 Whether English, or other natural languages, contain expressions which 
are best treated as context-shifting operators, or whether such operators can 
be added to natural languages is an open empirical question. Whatever the 
answer to the empirical question, the results of the paper show that one 
cannot ban context-shifting operators on the basis that they are incompati-
ble with compositionality. Such operators are incompatible with content-
compositionality but are compatible with character compositionality. If a 
theorist has good arguments to believe that natural languages contain con-
text-shifting operators, but she desires to retain compositionality she must 
settle on character-compositionality. Only if someone has good independ-
ent arguments to believe that propositional content must be compositional 
and that compositionality is non-negotiable, can she give a principled ar-
gument against context-shifting operators. That is, only if one believes that 
content compositionality explains, but character compositionality fails to 
explain certain features of natural languages that we expect semantic theo-
ries to model is one entitled to ban context-shifting operators on the basis 
that they ruin the content-compositional machinery. In fact, Rabern & Ball 
(2017) convincingly argue that Kaplan’s ban on context-shifting operators 
rests on his further theoretical commitments that tied him to the idea that 
propositional content must be compositional. More precisely, Kaplan is 
wedded to the idea that one and the same entity must play two roles: (a) be 
the object of natural language operators, such that these operators can be 
defined compositionally, and (b) the content of speech acts and the object 
of propositional attitudes. Only propositional contents, and not characters, 
can be the content of speech acts and the object of propositional attitudes. 
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